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Abstract
In contrast to increasing debates on China’s rising status as a global scientific power, issues of China’s science 
communication remain under-explored. Based on 21 in-depth interviews in three cities, this article examines 
Chinese scientists’ accounts of the entangled web of influence which conditions the process of how scientific 
knowledge achieves (or fails to achieve) its civic authority. A main finding of this study is a ‘credibility 
paradox’ as a result of the over-politicisation of science and science communication in China. Respondents 
report that an absence of visible institutional endorsements renders them more public credibility and better 
communication outcomes. Thus, instead of exploiting formal channels of science communication, scientists 
interviewed were more keen to act as ‘informal risk communicators’ in grassroots and private events. 
Chinese scientists’ perspectives on how to earn public support of their research sheds light on the nature 
and impact of a ‘civic epistemology’ in an authoritarian state.
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1. Introduction
In contrast to increasing interest in China’s rising status as global scientific power, China’s public 
engagement efforts remain under-explored. Among the limited empirical studies on science com-
munication in China, the focus has mainly been on evaluating the outcome of related national 
campaigns, such as public science literacy, rather than the process of how such efforts are carried 
out (see Chen et al., 2009; Lü, 2009). This empirical inattentiveness to the actual practice of scien-
tific communication may be partially due to three widely shared characterisations of Chinese sci-
ence communication: (1) science communication in China is dominated by the government, which 
acts both as the main sponsor and organiser; (2) such a top-down approach is often seen as resem-
bling a ‘deficit model’ of public engagement; and (3) similarly, apart from top-down initiatives, 
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other civil actors, in particular Chinese scientists, seem to be much less enthusiastic in engaging 
with the public (Chen et al., 2009; Jia and Liu, 2014). In other words, the landscape of China’s sci-
ence communication seems rather bare and straightforward; thus, there seems not much to be 
investigated. Both academic studies and media analysis have attributed the perceived reluctance of 
Chinese scientists to engage with publics to a conventional academic culture which does not value 
public engagement, and to scientists’ lack of awareness of their social responsibilities (Hu, 2010; 
Wu and Qui, 2012; Zhao, 2014).
To be sure, the public engagement with science, aiming to involve diversified stakeholders to 
establish a ‘hybrid forum’ and to strengthen ‘societal regulation’ of science is still in its infancy in 
China (Callon et al., 2009; Jelsøe et al., 2006: 45–49; Zhang, 2012). This is reflected in existing 
studies on public communication in the field of nanotechnology, genetic modification (GM) tech-
nologies, vaccination and the promotion of scientific literacy in general (Jia and Liu, 2014; Leong 
et al., 2011; Ren et al., 2014). The nascent state of science communication in China can also be 
seen from official government documents which lack the vocabulary to describe various interac-
tions between science and the public. Currently, the term ‘kexue puji’, or kepu for short, is used as 
a catch-all terminology to incorporate a range of science communication activities (Ministry of 
Science and Technology China (MOST), 2012; State Council, 2006). Literally translated as ‘sci-
ence popularisation’, kepu incorporates a spectrum of activities, ranging from one-way science 
education to interactive public dialogue, from one-off media events to sustained community 
engagements (MOST, 2012; State Council, 2006; Zhao, 2014).
Based on recent fieldwork, this article argues that this ‘neat’ depiction of Chinese science com-
munication as a top-down ‘deficit’ approach with unenthusiastic scientists may be misleading. As 
rightly pointed out by previous comparative studies of alternative public engagement in Asia, sci-
ence communication in authoritarian societies, such as China, cannot be simply equated to a ‘defi-
cit model’ (Leong et al., 2011). Reducing the perceived communicative attitudes of the Chinese 
state and Chinese scientists to a ‘deficit model’ framework obscures crucial differences in the 
power-relations among the state, the scientific community and the public. It also blinds us from 
identifying actual governing challenges these differences entail. Thus, to fully comprehend the 
myths and realities of public engagement in China, a closer examination of how stakeholders inter-
pret, accommodate, question, subvert and transform science communication strategies is required.
To fill this gap of knowledge, this article sets out a preliminary empirical investigation on the 
entangled web of influences underlying China’s science communication, with a focus on the 
views of Chinese scientists. Data used in this article are based on 21 interviews conducted by a 
collaborative UK–China research project in three Chinese cities. 
By employing Sheila Jasanoff’s (2005a, 2012) ‘civic epistemology’ thesis and Brian Wynne’s 
(1980, 2001) ‘public alienation’ thesis, this article illuminates the process of how scientific knowl-
edge achieves its civic authority through negotiating with and adapting to social and political 
expectations.
The importance of examining China’s public science communication is not limited to the fact 
that China is a ‘leading influence’ in the global organisation and delivery of scientific innovation 
(Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for Business Innovation & Skills (BIS), 
2013). Effective public communication is essential for maximising the uptake and application of 
scientific research carried out in, and with, China (Moreno, 2010). More importantly, as rightly 
pointed out by policy scholars Leong et al. (2011), the theorisation of public acceptance of science 
has hitherto been based mainly on Western liberal-democratic states; how contentious technologies 
acquire their social support in societies where ‘states play much more active and central roles’ 
necessitates empirical examination (p. 135). By investigating Chinese scientists’ account of the 
entangled web of influence which conditions how scientific knowledge achieves (or fails to 
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achieve) its civic authority, this article furthers the civic epistemology thesis by extending its dis-
cussion to an authoritarian state.
2. Credibility of science and civic epistemology
With the recognition of the ambiguity and contingency of contemporary science, there is an increas-
ing consensus that the credibility of scientific knowledge is not a given but is socially validated 
(Callon et al., 2009; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 2004; Jelsøe et al., 2006; Miller, 2005). In her 
seminal work, Designs on Nature, Sheila Jasanoff (2005a) powerfully argued that scientific knowl-
edge can only establish its authority when it is articulated, deliberated and valourised in a way that 
meets entrenched cultural expectations and conforms to public reasoning. These socio-politically 
grounded ‘knowledge-ways’ through which citizens ‘assess the rationality and robustness of claims 
that seek to order their lives’ are what she defined as civic epistemology (Jasanoff, 2004, 2005a: 249).
Jasanoff’s ‘civic epistemology’ thesis has value beyond simply highlighting the importance of 
social validation and mapping out key indicators to categorise public knowledge-ways into com-
parable ideal-types. To be sure, Jasanoff (2005a) herself has cautioned that simple characterisation 
alone is ‘at enormous risk of reductionism’ (p. 259). Rather, the most significant contribution of the 
‘civic epistemology’ thesis is that it offers an alternative paradigm to think about the public under-
standing of science and in the process, makes social research more instrumental in improving our 
political life (Jasanoff, 2005a: 250–255). In relation to this article, there are two illuminating points 
in Jasanoff’s civic epistemology theorisation.
First, from a civic epistemology perspective, the diagnostic capacity of social research in pro-
moting the public understanding of science does not come from deducing what the public should 
be informed. Rather, it comes from questioning why certain patterns of behaviours are deployed 
for science to gain broad-base support in a given society (Jasanoff, 2004, 2012; Miller, 2008). 
More specifically, through her comparative research in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, Jasanoff (2005) underlines the need to examine the entrenched social-political relations 
between the state, the scientific community and the public – for these relations form the basis of 
how scientific knowledge is produced and validated.
Second, by recognising the relational leverages different social actors have in legitimising scien-
tific knowledge, the civic epistemology framework highlights that questions of ‘who communicates’ 
and ‘how’ become just as important as ‘what’ is being communicated. On this point, Jasanoff drew 
on Brian Wynne’s research on the public understanding of science. She argued that the rifts of atti-
tudes towards certain scientific practice may not be a result of some social actors being better 
informed than others, but because they may be differently informed (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 
2005a: 253–255). Communicative efforts insensitive to existing social-political expectations may 
preemptively ‘engender alienation and suspicion on the part of the public’ (Wynne, 2001: 457).
This article follows this line of inquiry. Rather than simply rallying for more scientists’ involve-
ment in open public dialogue as a corrective to China’s current science communication, this article 
questions patterns of behaviour and the underlying power-relations that give rise to the ‘credibility 
paradox’ phenomenon. Analysis of how scientists interpret and contrast their capacity to meet 
social expectations as formal and informal risk communicators sheds light on how social validation 
of scientific agendas is conditioned in an authoritarian state.
3. Methodology and structure
The data used in this article contribute to a larger collaborative UK–China project on improving 
public accountability of science in China. This study was jointly funded by the China Association 
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Table 1. Participants’ information.
Participants Gender Age group Location Position Area of study
Interviewee 1 F 35–39 Wuhan Associate professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 2 M 35–39 Hangzhou Associate professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 3 F 45–49 Wuhan Professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 4 M 40–44 Wuhan Professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 5 F 40–44 Wuhan Professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 6 M 45–49 Wuhan Professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 7 M 45–49 Wuhan Professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 8 F 40–44 Beijing Associate professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 9 F 40–44 Beijing Professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 10 M 35–39 Wuhan Associate professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 11 M 35–39 Wuhan Professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 12 M 45–49 Beijing Professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 13 F 40–44 Hangzhou Associate professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 14 M 35–39 Beijing Assistant professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 15 M 35–39 Beijing Assistant professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 16 F 40–44 Beijing Associate professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 17 F 45–49 Beijing Associate professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 18 M 35–39 Beijing Assistant professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 19 M 35–39 Beijing Associate professor Biomedical sciences
Interviewee 20 M 45–49 Hangzhou Professor Environmental sciences
Interviewee 21 M 45–49 Hangzhou Professor Biomedical sciences
for Science and Technology and the Economic and Social Research Council in the United Kingdom. 
The author interviewed 21 Chinese scientists in 2014 and 2015 in three research-intensive cities: 
Beijing, Wuhan and Hangzhou (Nature Publishing Group, 2013: 16). Participants’ information is 
summarised in Table 1.
This study took a combination of purposeful and snowballing sampling techniques. The research 
team primarily contacted universities’ research offices for recommendations of staff with at least 
5 years of working experience after completing their PhDs, and who are currently working in the 
areas of either environmental or biomedical sciences. We then relied on a few interviewees to 
recruit further contacts. This study chose to focus on practitioners from environmental and bio-
medical sciences for they are two leading investment areas in China’s science and technology 
(S&T) strategies. They are also arguably the two most controversial areas in the public domain. 
Incidences such as the 2012 Golden Rice controversy and unproven stem cell therapies have gener-
ated much public criticism and distrust, and highlighted the urgency for effective public engage-
ment in China (Cryanoski, 2012; Qiu, 2012). Among the recommendations, we selected scientists 
who have either been a principle investigator or a co-investigator on publicly funded projects. 
Compared to their colleagues, this cohort of scientists normally has more exposure to media inter-
views and other forms of public dialogue. In the end, our sample consists of 8 female and 13 male 
scientists, aged between 35 and 48. While none of the interviewees have integrated public engage-
ment as part of their scientific project, all of the participants recognised the importance of good 
science communication. They shared with us their perception of science communication events 
they contributed to or had access to. Although disciplinary comparison is not of primary concern 
to this article, it is useful to note that of the 21 interviewees, 12 were from environmental sciences 
and 9 from the biomedical sciences. There was no evident divergence of views on the state of 
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China’s science communication from the two disciplines. Similarly, there was also no visible dif-
ference from a gender perspective. It must be noted that given the sample size, this article does not 
aim to be representative or definitive. Rather, it should be read as similar to other small scale stud-
ies of science communities which are often seen as particularly valuable in under-researched areas 
(see Cao and Suttmeier, 2001; Parry, 2006; Zhang, 2010). It allows us to identify important themes 
that may benefit from future study.
Each interview lasted for approximately an hour. The recordings were transcribed, coded and 
analysed with the use of NVivo 10 (Charmaz, 2006). Coding was established through two phases. 
Initial coding mainly consisted of descriptive typologies that helped to sort the range of communi-
cation scenarios into categories of ‘Institutional’ (with sub-categories of ‘government’ and ‘media’) 
and ‘Non-institutional’ (with sub-categorises of ‘personal’ and ‘civil society’). Then ‘axial coding’, 
such as ‘incentive’, ‘communicative relation’ and ‘interpretation of outcome’, was developed to 
further ‘dimensionalise’ the data and establish analytical links between categories (Charmaz, 2006: 
60–63; Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 123–142).
This article’s discussion is structured as follows: section ‘Introduction’ contextualises China’s 
government-led science communication initiatives by critically reviewing the evolving role of sci-
ence in the contemporary Chinese polity. This section points out that, similar to other socialist 
states, there seems to be an over-politicisation of science and of science communication in China 
(Linkova and Stockelova, 2012). When scientific accountability is often seen as subordinate to 
Communist Party accountability, it engenders alienation and distrust on the part of the civil actors 
(Wynne, 2001). Further to this discussion, this article has two twin sections on how Chinese scien-
tists articulate the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of science communication. The section ‘Credibility of science 
and civic epistemology’ discusses a shared uneasiness expressed by scientists interviewed. That is, 
when they interacted with the public as an institutional scientist, they felt impelled to constantly 
check and adapt what they communicate so as to balance their professional accountability to the 
public and their obligation to adhering Party rhetoric. This makes public communication a burden-
some and precarious business which many interviewees prefer to avoid or simply felt as beyond 
their expertise. However, this does not mean that Chinese scientists are public-averse. In fact, as 
section ‘Methodology and structure’ illustrates, a number of scientists interviewed were quite keen 
to explore alternative ways to gain public understanding and support of their research. In the eyes 
of the interviewees, the public perception of scientists’ credibility was often inversely proportional 
to the level of institutional backing. This ‘credibility paradox’ in China’s science communication 
shed insights on the pluralistic and contending nature of social validation of scientific knowledge 
(Callon et al., 2009; Jasanoff, 2012).
An over-politicisation of science communication
Science has always been a ‘politicum’, in which political and scientific communities lead public 
deliberation on collective actions (Linkova and Stockelova, 2012). China is not unique in tying 
science to its modernisation project. But as pointed out by Shiela Jasanoff (2005b: 214), what is of 
analytical interest is not so much the ‘“fact” of science’s embeddedness in politics’, but the evolv-
ing ‘nature’ of how science functions in political rhetoric.
Since China’s political reform in 1978, science has been seen as a ‘production force’ expected 
to lead to tangible improvement of living standards (MOST, 2005). In 1995, then President Jiang 
Zemin (1995) formally proposed ‘rejuvenating the nation through science and technology’ (kejiao 
xingguo) as a national strategy. Jiang’s proposal was further upgraded to the status of ‘foundational 
national policy’ (jiben guoce) by the State Council (1996) the following year. The political value 
of science in rejuvenating national productivity was reflected in popular science publications and 
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was to ‘serve’ both industrial and agricultural production and ‘the communist ideology’ (Wu and 
Qiu, 2012: 526).
In practice, China’s S&T system is highly centralised. Almost all regulatory decisions and fund-
ing can be traced back to a handful of ministerial-level organisations that are under the direct 
leadership of the State Council. Despite China’s recent efforts to reorient its innovation system to 
a market-based approach, comparing to most developed countries, government sponsorship 
remains crucial for scientific research. For example, currently, private investment only accounts 
for 11% of academic research, as compared to 70% in the United States (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2012).
In parallel to its fast S&T development, the Chinese government has also recognised that the 
public understanding of science is important for its knowledge economy to forge ahead (Chen 
et al., 2009). In June 2002, the Standing Committee of China’s Ninth National People’s Congress 
promulgated the world’s first national legislation on scientific engagement, The People’s Republic 
of China Science and Technology Popularisation of Law. The second chapter of this law formally 
recognises the government’s leadership in scientific communication. It demands governments at 
county level and higher incorporate science communication into its ‘national economy and society 
development plans’. The role of scientific communities, as stated in this legislation, is to ‘assist’ the 
government’s agenda setting (National People’s Congress, 2002). The political importance of sci-
ence communication was re-emphasised through two high profile documents: the State Council’s 
(2006) Outline of National Action Scheme of Scientific Literacy for All Chinese Citizens and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology’s China (2012) National Special Planning of Science 
Popularisation in the Twelfth Five Year Plan. In this 2012 document, while diversified social con-
tributions are mentioned, it further consolidates the commanding role of the government in plan-
ning, organising and delivering science communication (MOST, 2012: 5, 17).
In short, science communication in China follows a top-down approach with an acute sensitivity 
towards serving economic and political objectives. This state dominance is exhibited in the devel-
opment of both traditional scientific disciplines as well as emerging science, such as biomedicine 
and nanotechnologies (Jia and Liu, 2014; Leong et al., 2011; Ren, 2014). It is true that China is not 
unique in politicising science. But when science and science communication are deeply entrenched 
with state directives, government sponsorship and centralised control, the supposed mutual rela-
tion between a politicisation of science and a scientification of politics seems to be one-sided.
This over-politicisation of science communication is further exhibited when examining an 
often neglected question of ‘how states recognise who is an expert’ (Jasanoff, 2012: 11). Previous 
comparative research on China’s and United Kingdom’s’ public communication of biomedical 
practices pointed out that while experts in the British media acted as independent professionals 
who ‘speak for themselves’, experts in the Chinese media were often selected by the authorities 
for their ‘policy compatibility’ (Ren et al., 2014: 372). To some extent, one could argue that 
science communication in China is an alternative form of policy engagement. The aim to justify 
political agendas is just as important as popularising scientific knowledge.
One immediate consequence of overshadowing science communication with political directives 
seemed to be a ‘public alienation’ problem identified by Brian Wynne. As one lecturer at the 
University of Science and Technology Beijing commented, ‘sometimes the case is if it [science 
communication] is government-led, the public will refuse to trust it’ (Interviewee 15). Given the 
Chinese government’s poor record of accountable governance, such as on issues of food safety, 
environment degradation and clinical trials, this public scepticism towards government communi-
cation may not be surprising (Cryanoski, 2012; Qiu, 2012; Zhang and Barr, 2013). As was indi-
cated by Wynne (1980, 2001), public scepticism is less a response to the risk and benefits of the 
specific technology, and more a response to the trustworthiness and value-orientations of the 
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institutional science and policy. Questions such as how Chinese scientists situate themselves within 
the web of contentious relations between the state and society and where they see their contribution 
and responsibilities become important. This is the analytical focus of the next two sections.
‘Willing but inactive’ – concession and protest of Chinese scientists
With intensified transnational scientific exchange and an increasing number of overseas-return 
scientists, Chinese research culture has undergone rapid transformation in recent decades (Zhang, 
2012). One environmental scientist in Beijing, who was in his mid-30s, pointed out that the con-
ventional portrayal of Chinese scientists as a socio-politically dispassionate group who pursue their 
professional interests within well-walled ivory towers may have become an outdated cliché. This 
old characterisation ignored a ‘generation gap’ between Chinese scientists:
It is without doubt that we [scientists] want to do more for the ordinary citizens (lao baixing) … we have 
social responsibilities … For previous generations of Chinese scientists – those who were born in the 50s 
or 60s – they may think that they only need to answer to the Communist Party, or the government … But 
I think many for my generation and younger ones, we have realised that our funding comes from the tax 
payers, and our research should be accountable to them. (Interviewee 15)
Interviewee 15’s view on being accountable to the tax payers was echoed by almost all of the 
scientists we talked to. A number of scientists explicitly pointed out explaining and discussing 
research findings with the public as an important part of conducting ‘accountable’ science and 
being a responsible scientist (Interviewees 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 16). However, across the three cities, our 
interviews invariably fell into one same pattern: while scientists recognised their social responsi-
bilities, and were (in theory) willing to engage with the public, they were all, in fact, reluctant or 
inactive in participating in public discussions of their own research areas. One typical response was 
from a professor in Wuhan: ‘I usually follow relevant public debates online, but I rarely contribute 
anything to the discussion (Interviewee 11)’.
This ‘willing but inactive’ phenomenon is consistent with a 2011 quantitative study on Chinese 
scientists’ involvement in science communication. In the survey, 94% of the scientists questioned 
recognised public engagement as a social responsibility. But only 20% had made any contribution, 
such as writing popular science articles, participating in media or public events (Jia and Liu, 2011).
In our study, we further explored the reasons behind this lack of action and identified three main 
factors. We first speculated if this was due to busy work schedules. One associate professor at 
Peking Union Medical College corrected us and explained that, given the over-politicisation of 
science in China, who communicates to the public was not just a matter of professional ability, but 
was a matter of one’s ‘political qualification’:
It is not so much that my colleagues and I don’t want to contribute [to public communication]. We do. But 
most of the time, these public occasions seem to be more appropriate for the ‘Big Experts’ (da zhuanjia). 
Scientists like us are not at the liberty to say much. (Interviewee 8)
An associate professor at Hubei University of Technology put it more bluntly:
I don’t think these public occasions are something we front-line (yixian) scientists can handle. It is a shame 
though that the voice from the front-line is diminishing. (Interviewee 1)
It is interesting to note that, similar to the two professors above, a majority of scientists we inter-
viewed made a distinction between two types of Chinese scientists: (1) The ‘front-line’ scientists, 
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who are the backbone of institutional research but have not yet acquired high administrative status, 
and (2) the ‘Big Experts’, who have secured elite positions in the science-political establishment. 
These Big Experts may be reaching retirement age and may no longer be research active, but they 
still act as ‘legitimate’ spokespersons for their respective fields as they are seen to be more proficient 
in adapting to political rhetoric.
Similar to Interviewees 8 and 1, as science communication is closely tied to the vindication 
of development agendas, a number of scientists interviewed felt public engagement had 
slipped outside their professional ‘expertise’ and can be potentially ‘troublesome’. A professor 
at Wuhan University half-jokingly told us that, ‘I do my best to avoid the media … as I do not 
want to inflict trouble (re-shi)’ (Interviewee 4). A professor in Beijing also shared a personal 
anecdote:
Last year the newspaper, Science and Technology Daily, invited me to write an article for them. The editor 
specifically asked me to make my views clear – that request immediately gave me a headache, I told him 
to forget it, it was too troublesome. (Interviewee 12)
It may appear puzzling that a university professor was daunted by the request of writing a popu-
lar science article with a ‘clear view’. But it should be remembered that, as pointed out in 
section 1, the Chinese government remains the primary, and sometimes only, funding source for 
research. Individual scientists as well as research institutions need to be seen as non-offensive and 
not ‘trouble-inflicting’ by the government in exchange for patronage (Zhang, 2012: 33, 89–92). 
The primary concern of science communication for scientists and scientific institutions then is to 
avoid provoking public concerns or stirring up social debates. In contentious areas, such as pollu-
tion control and experimental therapies, this can be a tricky business. An undesirable public inter-
pretation of a scientist’s ‘clear view’ may endanger one’s career. The apprehension attached to 
science communication was not only experienced at the individual level, but was also a pressure 
felt by universities and research academies. Previous studies have indicated that, without clear 
instructions from the government, local institutions often feel that ‘organising or being involved in 
public debates could bring political risk’ (Jia and Liu, 2014: 35).
To some extent, the scientific community seems to be troubled by a ‘double clientelism’ identi-
fied by communication scholar Yu Hailing (2009a: 91–94). Yu (2009a) considered ‘clientelism’ as 
a ‘defining characteristic of Chinese society’ in which social actors need to act for their patrons in 
return for support and sponsorship (p. 182). In the case of science communication, as in other 
forms of mediation, scientists are stretched to meet the demands of two patrons (Yu, 2009b). That 
is, they need to cater to the interests of the public while at the same time attending to the political 
expectations of the state. This may not necessarily be unique to China, as the influence of govern-
ment patronage can be observed in many countries. However, when the financial and administra-
tive leverages are heavily tilted towards the state, scientists’ bargaining power in the patron–client 
relationship with the government seems to be limited. The business of safeguarding this one-sided 
relationship can be a ‘headache’ (Interviewees 4, 12), and many scientists may feel that they are not 
up to the task (Interviewees 1, 8).
A related second factor that persuaded most scientists to remain silent was a commonly shared 
frustration of being kept ‘out of the loop’ in science-based policy making. One example was from 
a senior environmental science professor:
Whenever the municipal government have launched new guidelines or promulgated new industrial 
standards, I receive requests to comment on them. But this is a weird logic: I was never consulted in the 
policy making process, I do not understand how they [the officials] arrived at these figures and based on 
what data, from where, how would I know [what to make of the new rules]? (Interviewee 3)
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To some extent, the perceived non-participatory attitude of Chinese scientists can also be inter-
preted as a form of scientists’ ‘protest’ to being excluded from science-based policy making. 
Previous research works have indicated that in contemporary China, given the overpowering prior-
ity of economic development, ‘expert advice’ often remains an obscure role in the final decision-
making process (Qiu, 2004; Zhang, 2012). An example was from Interviewee 1. She told us that 
when she was invited to policy consultation meetings, initially she took it quite seriously and made 
a number of suggestions. But to her dismay, she never heard any response. Interviewee 1 then 
concluded, ‘after a few times, you just gave up trying!’ Such frustration was expressed by another 
professor in Hangzhou:
The underlying tension is that the government wants to monopolise administrative decisions and control 
of resources, but let scientists assume associated public accountabilities. (Interviewee 21)
A third practical concern that discouraged scientific practitioners from contributing to public 
discussions of science was, as mentioned in section ‘Introduction’, public scepticisms as a result of 
the over-politicisation of science communication. Given this contention, despite elaborate govern-
ment efforts in this field, one lecturer at the University of Science and Technology in Beijing still 
believed a ‘platform for communication’ was yet to be built:
What Chinese science doesn’t have is a platform for communication. Having Big Experts as the public 
face is counter-productive, they conversely generate distrust among the public. Because the public 
would say that this was manipulated by the government, or there is some political cover-up. Voices from 
front-line scientific practitioners, like us, have increasingly been turned down. But if we can think 
differently for once and have a platform, on which ordinary scientists can demonstrate what they do, 
why they do it, and to what extent their output can solve certain problems, the public may be more 
accepting. (Interviewee 14)
This perceived general scepticism towards institutional science was further described by the 
above interviewee’s colleague:
There are two separate issues [in science communication]: ‘would you want to trust me’ is one thing, and 
‘can I sustain my trustworthiness’ is quite another … I can vouch for my findings, but if you [the public] 
are determined to be cynical, then I see no basis for a dialogue. (Interviewee 15)
As suggested by scientists interviewed, when the independence of scientific institutions is over-
shadowed by heavy political manoeuvres, it leads to a ‘credibility paradox’. The appearance of Big 
Experts only reinforced a public image of ‘organised irresponsibility’ (Beck, 1995: 58; Ren et al., 
2014). As one water pollution specialist described, when scientific accountability was perceived as 
subordinate to political directives, the public became ‘very impatient’: the public ‘now only hear half 
of what you are about to say and then go on developing their own interpretation’ (Interviewee 10).
To some extent, it seemed that science communication in China has set off on the wrong foot. 
An over-politicisation of science communication has significantly constrained Chinese scientists’ 
interpretation of their capacity as well as responsibilities in interacting with the public (points 1 and 
2 above). Its public alienation effect creates a ‘credibility paradox’ which further discourages sci-
entific practitioners from contributing to formal channels of public dialogue (point 3). The seem-
ingly voluntary withdrawal of Chinese scientists from public discussion is both a pragmatic 
concession to an asymmetry of power and an act of protest. This point is further supported from a 
different angle in the next section.
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The ‘informal communicators’: (re)-directing professional credibility
The previous section examined the ‘credibility paradox’ as the inversely correlated public creden-
tials attached to institutional endorsement. This section further illuminates this paradox from the 
other side of the story. That is, in contrast to their inactiveness in formal communication events, 
scientists interviewed showed more involvement with grassroots and private events. Given the 
limited space, I focus on two examples.
One of the most intriguing interviews of our fieldwork was with a genetically modified crop 
specialist at the Beijing Academy of Agriculture and Forestry Sciences. Similar to other interview-
ees, she saw formal channels of science communication as a terrain for the Big Experts or as she 
put it, ‘specialised government personnels’. She was unenthusiastic about media interviews, writ-
ing opinion pieces or participating in online debates. In fact, this professor believed that ‘the lack 
of desire for conversation [between the public and the scientific community] was mutual’ and she 
considered scientific outreach a ‘waste of time’. Yet interestingly, this professor emphasised scien-
tists’ social responsibilities to explain and discuss their work with the public, and she saw her ful-
filling of that responsibility in scenarios as follows:
There are a number of times when I was traveling on the train, passengers sitting next to me was chatting 
about GM foods with their friends. Some of them may make comments such as ‘we never cook with 
soybean oil at home. We only cook with peanut oil, because I think peanut oil may not be from GM crops’. 
This is when as a GM scientist, I feel a need to join the discussion. I would tell them they don’t need to be 
afraid of GM technique, maybe because I am a GM scientist so that I am not worried … People usually get 
really interested when they learnt that you are a GM scientist and ask me all kinds of questions … I would 
explain to them how [GM] proteins are digested in our body, and the fact that GM actually reduces the use 
of herbicide. Anyway, I see everyone has a right to express one’s view, so here is what I think, and fellow 
passengers may or may not accept my view … But every now and then, they see good reasoning in my 
argument and they may be convinced. (Interviewee 18)
Interviewee 18 was not alone in taking an interest in these informal conversations (Interviewees 
5, 17, 20, 21). One biomedical scientist, who works on metabolic therapies, also highlighted to us 
the value of engaging with grassroots events and sharing professional knowledge within personal 
networks:
A while ago, a local residential community invited me to take part a community [public health] activity. 
Unfortunately I didn’t go for I was busy on that day, but I am quite happy to contribute to this kind of 
events … The incentive? Quite simple: all scientists want to see their findings can make some difference 
and be put to some ‘use’ … I am not instructing people what they should not do, I’m just telling them what 
should be moderated … I feel most people are quite willing to take in your findings, but of course in 
practice, it is quite hard to make people adapt their life habit accordingly … I have experienced difficulties 
even with my own family … But you got to promote your ideas with them [the public] and wait for gradual 
change. (Interviewee 5)
This expressed interest in interacting with the public through grassroots channels is consistent 
with the authors’ previous qualitative studies on environmental science. A number of environmen-
tal scientists have been regular contributors to non-governmental organisation (NGO)-organised 
public seminars or field trips on weekends (Zhang and Barr, 2013).
There are three points worth highlighting in scientists’ expressed interests in being a communi-
cator of science in ‘informal’ (i.e. non-institutionally organised) events. First, it is important to note 
scientists’ framing of their social identities in participating in the above described public encoun-
ters. In Interviewee 18’s scenario, she was ‘a fellow passenger who happens to be specialised in 
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GM techniques’, rather than an institutionally endorsed expert. Similarly, in Interviewee 5’s case, 
she was to share her knowledge with the neighbourhood over an informal gathering. She would be 
seen more as a ‘fellow citizen with particular knowledge’ rather than an expert dispatched by the 
research institution. While both scientists still see their actions as part of their ‘professional’ 
responsibilities, they have, in their narrative, distinguished these communications from their 
employment duties as institutional scientists. Being a fellow passenger on the train, or a visitor of 
the neighbourhood have, to a large extent, de-politicised the communication process.
Second and relatedly, it is interesting to contrast scientists’ perception of the ‘public’ in formal 
and informal communication scenarios. It is useful to recall that, when discussing formal channels 
of science communication, the public was described by interviewees as a ‘very impatient’ and 
unreasonably ‘cynical’ audience (Interviewees 10, 15). Interviewee 18 explicitly noted a ‘mutual’ 
apathy of dialogue between the scientists and the public. But when the communication scenarios 
are de-politicised, the public attitude towards scientists seemed to be more receptive and welcom-
ing. Interviewee 18 felt the public ‘usually [got] really interested’ when knowing about her job, and 
Interviewee 16 experienced similar affirmations as the public appeared to be ‘quite willing to take 
in’ her view. One Hangzhou professor working on agricultural pollution also observed that the 
public can be ‘janus-faced’: ‘Peasants in general are willing to hear scientists’ advice … but if it 
[scientific advice] is imposed as blanket administrative decisions, peasants will also not hesitate to 
curse you’ (Interviewee 20).
Among these two conflicting images of the ‘public’, the ‘supportive public’ in informal settings 
may be a more accurate representation of the Chinese public’s attitude towards science itself. In a 
2003 public opinion survey adapted from the Eurobarometer exercise, the result indicated a ‘very 
positive attitude’ and high support among the Chinese public across different scientific applications, 
so long as they could see the ‘usefulness’ of these new technologies (Lü, 2009: 490–491). This sur-
vey data, in addition to the qualitative findings of the research presented here, further reinforced the 
article’s argument that the perceived public suspicion and rejection in science communications may 
not be a reaction to science itself, but to the perceived intention and to the ‘behaviour, track-record, 
and trustworthiness of the institutions in charge’ (Wynne, 1980, 2001: 454). When scientists’ de-
formalised their politically charged institutional affiliations and redirected their professional identity 
as fellow citizens, they seemed to (re)gain their credentials from the public.
Third, despite a more receptive audience, scientists interviewed exhibited a sensible and prag-
matic expectation of science communication. They recognised that the public is far from ‘uncriti-
cal’ or submissive (Lü, 2009). Take the above demonstrated cases for example. Interviewee 5 
recognised the ‘difficulties’ in asking people to adopt her health-care suggestions. She saw the 
point of participating in community activities not as to pass on ‘instructions’ but to anticipate 
‘gradual change’. On more contentious topics, such as GM foods, Interviewee 18 felt the urge to 
offer her advice when she encountered misconceptions in public. But Interviewee 18 was also at 
ease with the fact that some people ‘may or may not’ agree with her. The point of her engagement, 
then, was not to battle for consensus, but to offer ‘good reasoning’ and to exercise her rights both 
as a scientist and as a citizen ‘to express one’s view’. This seems to rebuke a conventional assumed 
‘naivety’ of Chinese scientists embedded in a ‘deficit mode’ depiction (Hu, 2010; Zhao, 2014). In 
fact, the majority of scientists interviewed indicated that, if opportunity allowed, they preferred 
conversational interactions with the public, rather than simply giving lectures (Interviewees 1, 14).
In short, the Chinese scientists we talked to believed that they could be more convincing to the 
public with their institutional hat off. As Wynne (2001) argued, public suspicion of science ‘goes 
much deeper than simply “disagreeing with” or “rejecting” experts views’ (p. 445). Rather, it is a 
rational response to the perceived institutional culture and associated political agenda. Chinese 
scientists’ redirection of their professional credibility as “informal” communicators is to address 
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the public alienation problem exhibited in government-led communications. To some extent, it 
could be argued that it is an effort towards restoring ‘civic epistemology’ back to the public dis-
course of science. That is, it effectively re-tunes the government rhetoric of science development 
to a social conversation, and re-orients the political enterprise of science to a collective civil 
project. The observed constraints in China’s government-led science communication and the per-
ceived value in informal engagements demonstrate the impact of a ‘civic epistemology’ and how 
the social validation of knowledge is necessarily a deliberation among multiple actors (Jasanoff, 
2005a). The interview data suggest that even in an authoritarian state such as China, political 
directives cannot fully replace a multi-perspective ‘civic’ epistemology in insuring public support 
of science.
4. A reflection on science communication in China
While Chinese science is racing ahead with generous investment on cutting-edge projects, its sci-
ence communication is often characterised as lagging behind with a twentieth-century top-down 
model, with seemingly unenthusiastic scientists. However, at a closer examination, for Chinese 
scientists interviewed, public engagement involves a calculative balance of observing and subvert-
ing institutional constraints so as to overcome the asymmetry of relations between science and 
politics.
Contrary to a common assumption that Chinese scientists are indifferent to public engagement 
(Hu, 2010; Wu and Qui, 2012), almost all of the scientists we interviewed explicitly acknowledged 
public communication as part of their social responsibilities and were willing to take part. However, 
one key, yet seemingly perplexing finding was a ‘credibility paradox’ in Chinese scientists’ narra-
tive of how effective public communication can be achieved. This is to say, the majority of them 
expressed scepticism, reluctance and even resistance towards participating in formal channels of 
science communication, such as responding to public queries through online or paper media. 
Rather, many scientists were more keen to act as ‘informal risk communicators’ (Richard, 2011) on 
private occasions or grassroots events. This is because they believed speaking as an ‘institutional 
scientist’ would invite additional public scepticism and contention. An absence of visible institu-
tional and official endorsements, conversely, would render them with more public credibility and 
lead to better conversations. This shared preference of being perceived as ‘unofficial carriers’ of 
information is revealing. 
It is true, as many have suggested, that China needs to replace its current ‘one-direction’ scien-
tific communication with ‘more engagement practices that feature open and equal public dialogues 
and debates’ (Jia and Liu, 2014: 32). But this article argues that for such dialogue to happen and to 
pull Chinese science communication out of the credibility paradox, one needs to first understand 
the culturally and politically embedded power dynamics that conditions effective communication. 
There are at least two useful insights that can be drawn from scientists’ view on science communi-
cation in China.
First, Chinese scientists’ actions in and perception of science communication suggests that even 
in authoritarian societies, ‘civic’ epistemology plays a tacit yet significant role in validating scien-
tific knowledge. This is to say, without justifying and adapting its value-orientation according to 
wider cultural and social expectations, political directives alone fall short in mitigating a multiplicity 
of public interpretations and cannot guarantee public uptake of a given scientific agenda (Jasanoff, 
2005a). Arguably, the ‘credibility paradox’ in China’s science communication exhibits a reactive 
impact of civic epistemology. That is, the overshadowing of a civic epistemology of science with 
political resolutions has not only made scientists feel ‘unqualified’ to contribute, but also has led 
them to redirect their professional credibility as ‘informal communicators’. Scientists’ reorientation 
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of their position as risk communicators, despite financial and administrative monopoly by the gov-
ernment, is an involuntary restoration of a public reasoning of science (Wynne, 1980, 2001).
Second, China may represent an extreme case of asymmetrical power-relations between the state, 
scientific community and society. However, China is hardly unique in having the national govern-
ment as the dominant and most powerful apparatus to direct public opinion and shape the conditions 
in which societies embrace or reject a new technology (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009: 77–78, 86; Leong 
et al., 2011). It is not the presence of government per se, but an over-politicisation of science that 
alienated the public (and the scientists) and paralysed effective communication in China. When 
government is selective in inviting ‘policy-compatible’ scientists as their spokespersons, then insti-
tutional science communication loses its capacity to ‘speaking truth to power’, and becomes instead 
‘power orchestrated truth’. Rather, the credibility paradox urges a change of mindset among Chinese 
policy-makers in conceptualising the relation between science and politics, which conditions the 
delivery and reception of scientific research. Thus, a useful lesson for both regulators and social 
scientists that can be drawn from China’s experience is that to promote a social uptake of emerging 
science, attentiveness to culturally entrenched knowledge-ways is crucial, but what is equally 
important is that it involves an intricate balancing act to maintain a level of reciprocity between a 
politicisation of science and a scientification of politics (Jasanoff, 2005b).
When looking through an analytical lens of civic epistemology, the landscape of China’s sci-
ence communication may not seem as ‘straightforward’ as commonly assumed. This article pre-
sents a small sample pilot study on this important yet under-explored area. Further empirical 
inquiries into the production and validation of knowledge in China’s other scientific disciplines 
and in other non-Western states would add valuable insights on the role of science in public life.
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